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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
DONALD G. BAIRD, EDITOR
DISTINGUISHING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CONTEMPT [WASHINGTON]
The line of demarcation between civil
and criminal contempts is exceedingly
hazy.' Contempt proceedings are neither
wholly civil nor altogether criminal, and it
may not always be easy to classify a par-
ticular contempt action as belonging to one
or the other category. It may partake of
the characteristics of both.2 For this rea-
son, such an action is said to be sui generis
by the courts. In general, contempts of
court for which punishment is inflicted for
the primary purpose of vindicating public
authority are denominated criminal. Those
in which the enforcement of civil rights
and remedies is the ultimate object are
called ciiil contempt proceedings. 3 Corpus
Juris Secundum defines civil contempt as
failing to do something ordered to be done
in a civil action for the benefit of the op-
posing party therein.' But that source
further intimates that what might ordin-
arily be a civil contempt may become a
criminal contempt when the authority of
the court is flouted.5
State v. Sanchez," a recent Washington
case, raises this question of determining the
differences between civil and criminal con-
tempt. In that case judgment had been
rendered against the appellant in a previous
filiation proceeding, but he had failed to
support the illegitimate child as directed
by the court in that proceeding. Action
I State v. Bland. 189 Mo. 197. 88 S. W. 28, 3
Ann. Cas. 1044 (1905): Costilla Land and Invest-
ment Co. v. Allen, 15 N. M. 528. 110 Pac. 847
(1910).
2 State ex rel. Dailey v. Dailey, 164 Wash. 140.
2 P. (2d) 79 (1931); In re Christensen Engineer-
ing Co., 194 U. S. 458 (1903) and cases cited:
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324
(1903).
':In re Nevitt. 117 Fed. 448 (1902); Bessette v.
W. B. Conkey, 194 U. S. 324 (1903): In re Debs.
158 U. S. 564 (1894); Gompers v. Buck Stove
for contempt was instituted by the deputy
prosecuting attorney for King County, and
appellant was adjudged guilty. Although
he was in arrears only twenty dollars. he
was ordered to pay fifty dollars into thL
?ourt within one week, or face incarcera-
tion until it should be paid. Appellant gave
notice of appeal, but did not post an appeal
bond, as is required in civil actions.7 Re-
spondent moved to dismiss the appeal for
the reason that the case was civil in nature,
and required the giving of a proper appeal
bond.
Because the lower court had failed to
make and enter findings of fact upon which
to rest its judgment of contempt, the re-
viewing court declared that it could not
make any determination of two important
problems in the case, viz., the problem of
determining the nature of the proceedings
from their purpose, i.e., whether they were
coercive or remedial, or punitive in whole
or in part. and the problem of the suffi-
ciency of inability to comply with an order
of the court as a defence for failure to com-
ply. The trial court is required to enter
its findings by statute and precedent.' If
the case was one of criminal contempt, ap-
peal bond was not necessary, and this
failure to enter findings would be sufficient
to remand it. For the purpose of remand-
ing, the court assumed this, but it reserved
and Range Co.. 221 U. S. 418 (1910). 34 L. R. A.
(NS) 874: Denny v. State. 203 Ind. 682. 182 N. E.
313 (1932); Root v. MacDonald, 260 Mass. 344.
157 N. E. 684 (1927). 54 A. L. R. 1422: State ex
rel. Dailey v. Dailey. 164 Wash. 140. 2 P'2d)
79 (1931).
4 17 C. J. S. 8. §6.
' Ibid.
6;4 Wash. (2d) 432. 104 P(2d) 464 (1940).
7 Rem. Rev. Stat. (1932) t1721.
' Rem. Rev. Stat t1932) §367: State ex rel.
Dunn v. Plese. 134 Wash. 443, 235 Pac. 961 (1925).
[728]
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the right to re-examine the question in the
event that the case should again appear
before it, amplified by appropriate findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The policy
behind such a decision is not hard to recog-
nize, but the real problem of determining
the differences between the two kinds of
contempt goes unsolved.
The outstanding case on this problem in
the federal courts is that of Gompers v.
Buck Stove and Range CoY There the
United States Supreme Court said that the
affirmative violation of an injunction, with-
out special elements of contumacy, called
for coercive action on the part of the court
and not for a punitive sentence.'0 The In-
diana court came squarely up against this
problem in Denny v. State." That case
also arose out of the violation of an injunc-
tion, and the trial court found the defen-
dants guilty of criminal contempt and
placed a fine upon them. The Supreme
Court of that state denounced such a de-
cision, saying 'that the injunction having
been granted solely for the protection of
the other parties to the suit, its violation is
a wrong primarily to those parties and not
to the state, and is, therefore, a civil rather
than a criminal contempt, in absence of an
intent to defy the court and thus affront
the dignity of the state.12
A similar view was taken in an earlier
Washington case: "There is a difference
between 'quasi-criminal contempt' and civil
contempt. A judgment for criminal con-
tempt is not only unnecessary, but posi-
tively unwarranted, unless there has been
a wilful disobedience of the court's order.
A party may be guilty of both a criminal
and a civil contempt, or may be guilty of
9 Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221
U. S. 418 (1910).
N, The following is an illuminating excerpt
from that opinion:
"For example. If the defendant should refuse
to pay alimony, or to make a conveyance re-
quired by a decree for specific performance, he
could be committed until he complied with the
order. Unless there were special elements of
contumacy, the refusal to pay or to comply
with the order is treated as being in resistance
to the other party rather than as contempt of
court. The order fbr imprisonment in this class
of cases, therefore, is not to vindicate the au-
thority of the law, but is remedial, and is in-
tended to coerce the defendant to do the thing
required by the order for the benefit of the
complainant. If imprisoned, as aptly stated in In
one and not the other. A criminal contempt,
actual or constructive, or, as Blackstone
says, 'direct or circumstantial,' partakes of
the quality of an offense against the state;
whereas, a civil contempt under the statute
is such a disobedience of an order of a court
of competent jurisdiction, entered for the
benefit or advantage of a party to a civil
action, as works a loss or injury to the liti-
gant. The one is quasi-criminal and the-
other is a civil wrong; the one is absolved
by a fine payable to the state or imprison-
ment, and the other, by reparation to the
other party litigant. Under Ballinger's Ann.
Codes and St., Sec. 5807, Pierce's Code,
Sec. 1476, providing that, if any loss or in-
jury to a party in an action prejudicial to
his rights therein have been caused by the
'contempt,' the court may give judgment
that the party aggrieved recover of the de-
fendant a sum sufficient'to indemnify him,
it is not necessary that the contempt be a
criminal one for which a fine could be ad-
judged."' 3 This is the general view taken
in cases of contempt arising out of viola-
tions of injunctions. 14
The closest analogous case to the princi-
pal case of this note is that of State ex rel.
Geiger v. Geiger, 5 a contempt proceeding
arising out of failure to pay alimony as
ordered in a divorce suit. Wilful disobedi-
erice of the mandate was alleged. The de-
fendant was found guilty of contempt by
the trial court; he appealed, but failed to
post the appeal bond as required in ap-
peals in civil cases. The appeal was dis-
missed because of this defect, the court say-
ing that the mandate being for the benefit
of the other party in the divorce suit, viola-
tion of it was an injury to her rather than
Re Nevitt, 54 C. C. A. 622, 117 Fed. 451, 'he car-
ries the keys of his prison in his pocket.' He
can end his sentence and discharge himself at
any moment by doing what he had previuusly
refused to do."
11203 Ind. 682. 182 N. E. 313 (1932).
12 Ibid.
13 State ex rel. Newcomen Boom Co. v. North
Shore Boom and Driving Co., 55 Wash. 1, 107
Pac. 196 (1910).
14 Costilla Land and Invest. Co. v. Allen, 15
N. M. 528, 110 Pac. 847 (1910); Gorham v. New
Haven, 82 Conn. 153, 72 AtI. 1012 (1909); Re
McCormack, 117 N. Y. S. 70 (1909); and the cases
cited in note 3 supra. with the exception of the
Washington case which involved the violation
of a mandate rather than an injunction.
-20 Wash. 181. 54 Pac. 1129 (1898).
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to the state. The court would not admit that
the "wilful disobedience" alleged was of
such a nature as to make the contempt
criminal rather than civil.
Further citation of authorities for the
point intended to be made would only be
redundant and tautologous. The point is
that "wilful disobedience of the court or-
der- or "special elements of contumacy"
must be shown to change an otherwise civil
contempt to one of a criminal nature, or
to give it a double aspect. Viewed in the
light of these opinions, the facts of the prin-
cipal case indicate that the contempt was
basically civil rather than criminal.
However, if this is assumed to be a case
of criminal contempt, the problem of the
function of the defendant's answer to the
contempt charge, in relation to the neces-
sity of entering findings of fact by the trial
court, presents itself. The question arising
is: Does the answer receive a different
treatment in the two types of proceedings,
and are findings of fact required in both?
The defendant's answer to the show cause
order very clearly sets out his inability to
comply with the order of the court in the
filiation proceeding to support the child.
The defendant alleged that all his meagre
wages as a hotel clerk and as an employee
of a steamship company had been needed
to support his own family; that he had been
involuntarily unemployed since the incep-
tion of the filiation suit.
The effect given the defendant's answer
in a contempt action depends upon whether
or not a state still follows the old common
law rule. Where the common law is fol-
lowed, quite a bit of difference is attached
1; 17 C. J. S. 108 §83.
37 People v. Rongetti. 344 Ill. 107. 176 N. E.
292 (1931); Zuver v. State. 188 Ind. 60, 121 N. E.
828 (1919,.
,1 People v. Gilbert. 281 Ill. 619. 118 N. E. 196
(1917): State v. Branner. 174 Ind. 684. 93 N. E.
70 (1910).
]!'Stewart v. State. 140 Ind. 7. 39 N. E. 508
(1895).
2E, Ibid.; People v. White. 334 Ill. 465. 166 N. E.
100. 64 A. L. R. 1006 (1929).
21 Rem. Rev. Stat. (1932) §367: State ex rel.
Dunn v. Plese. 134 Wash. 443. 235 Pac. 961 (1925).
22 In State ex rel. Dailey v. Dailey. 164 Wash.
140. 2 P(2) 79. (1931). the court declared that
if the proceeding is for criminal contempt. the
presumption is that the defendant is innocent.
and he cannot be examined concerning the mat-
ters which were the subject-matter of the in-
quiry. To hold otherwise would be to allow
to the answer in the two types of contempt
proceedings.'" A denial under oath is con-
clusive in criminal contempt, ' - and no evi-
dence is taken.'- If the denial is false, the
defendant may be punished for perjury.
but may not be held in contempt.'- In civil
contempt cases, however, the denial is not
conclusive and the court may hear evi-
dence.'- Although the question of the func-
tion of the answer has not been raised di-
rectly in the State of Washington, neither
statute:- nor the cases recognize a differ-
ence in its operation in the two types of
contempt actions, and apparently, evidence
can be taken in bothY2
It is almost universally held that inability
to pay money in accordance with the order
of the court is a good defense to the charge
of contempt.2 ; Cases arising out of the
failure to pay alimony or separate mainte-
nance costs are the closest analogies found
in the state of Washington to the principal
case, and in those cases lack of present
ability to pay is a complete defense.
2
'
Therefore, if the defendant in the principal
case can establish the defense alleged. he
should not be found guilty of either crim-
inal or civil contempt, if the same rule ap-
plies to maintenance of an illegitimate child
as applies to alimony and separate mainte-
nance cases; and there seems to be no
ground on which to distinguish the cases
in this regard.
As to the necessity of findings of fact and
conclusions of law, a distinction between
civil and criminal contempt actions is rec-
ognized where the common law view ob-
tains. As to findings of fact in civil con-
tempt where the common law distinction is
self-incrimination. If criminal and civil con-
tempt are combined in the same action, if the
defendant is questioned, the court's power to
enter a purely punitive order cannot there-
after be invoked.
2:t In re Sobol. 242 Fed. 487. (C. C. A.): Muel-
ler v. Van Driessche. 236 Ill. App. 420 (1925):
Laff v. Laff. 161 Minn. 122. 200 N. W. 936 (1924):
Burack v. Mayers. 122 N. J. Eq. 270. 194 Atl.
178 (1937): In re Lieberman. 264 N. Y. S. 303
(1933): State v. Phipps. 174 Wash. 443. 24 PI2d)
1073 (1933).
21 State ex rel. Smith v. Smith. 17 Wash. 430.
50 Pac. 52 (1897); State ex rel Olsen v. Allen.
14 Wash. 684. 45 Pac. 644 (1896); In re Ander-
son. 97 Wash. 683, 167 Pac. 70 (1917): Snook v.
Snook. 110 Wash. 310..188 Pac. 502. 9 A. L. R.
262 (1920): Hubbard v. Hubbard. 130 Wash. 593.
228 Pac. 692 (1924).
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recognized we refer to Ruling Case Law:
"That the facts constituting the contempt
need not be set out in the record is the
general rule in England, and there are some
authorities in this country holding that a
judgment or sentence for contempt is valid
without any recital of the facts which con-
stituted the contempt where there are mov-
ing papers which contain the facts. But
there is a decided tendency toward adopt-
ing a rule which obviously serves the surer
ends of justice, that a court has no right
to adjudge a party to be in contempt of
court without making findings of fact show-
ing as a matter of law that the party ac-
cused is in fact guilty of contempt."
If the case is one of criminal contempt,
the same source says, "In some courts,
when defendant is attached for contempt
of court for a criminal offense and files a
sworn answer, that answer, if sufficient
to purge him of the alleged contempt, may
be taken as true and the defendant dis-
charged. But this rule applies only where
the proceeding is brought to vindicate the
law or dignity of the court, and does not
apply to acts treated as contempts, for the
enforcement of orders and decrees, as a
part of the remedy sought to be enforced;
and it has been held not to be conclusive.12 5
However, the principal case was properly
remanded for findings of fact because
Washington has done away with the com-
mon law distinction and requires such find-
ings of fact in all contempt actions.'- , In
states such as Illinois or Indiana, which re-
tain the older view, such an order could
not be entered by the reviewing court. The
defendant in a criminal contempt case
would be ordered released upon his sworn
answer.
2 7
Assuming this case to be one of criminal
contempt, the defendant is imprisoned in-
definitely until he pays the fine, not until
he complies with the order of the court
in the original filiation action. Nowhere
can authority be foxind for this form of sen-
tence in a criminal trial. It means that the
defendant must face life-long imprison-
ment if he is so unfortunate as not to have
money to pay the fine imposed on him. He
surely wold not have the opportunity to
earn money to pay it while in prison. Such
a judgment recalls to mind our legislative
movement to abolish debtors' prisons, and
.makes one feel that the courts have lost
sight of the policy behind it when it passes
such a harsh and unreasonable sentence.
The penalty should be determinate in time
or certain as to the amount of money. '8
There cannot be an indeterminate sentence
passed upon a specific fine.2 9
The court has the alternative bf viewing
the fine as being for the benefit of the ille-
gitimate child. This, however, would make
the suit a civil one, and the appeal would
fail for want of an appeal bond.
JosEPH C. OwNs.
COMPENSATION FOR COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL [INDIANA]
The sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right ... to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense"; practically all of
the states have similar provisions either
in their constitutions or in statutes almost
2-56 R. C. L. 526 §49.
26 Rem. Rev. St. (1932) §367; State ex rel.
Dunn v. Plese. 134 Wash. 443, 235 Pac. 961
(1925).
27 People v. Gilbert, 281 Ill. 619, 118 N. E. 292
(1917); State v. Branner, 174 Ind 684, 93 N. E.
70 (1910).
2A Rem. Rev. St. (1932) §1050 declares that in
this type of case the fine cannot exceed three
hundred dollars nor the imprisonment six
months. If the criminal code section, Rem. Rev.
St. §2206, applies, there is no objection to the
judgment. That section provides for the reduc-
contemporaneous with their constitutions.
The laws of many of these states have
gone on to provide that where an indigent
defendant in a criminal case is unable to
hire an attorney the court will appoint
counsel for him.' But where there is no
such provision the courts have held that
tion of the amount of the fine by three dollars
for every day spent in jail. Gompers v. Buck
Stove and Range Co.. 221 U. S. 418, 34 L. R. A.
'NS) 874 (1910).
-!' Ibid.
Knox County Council v. State ex rel. Mc-
Cormick, 29 N. E. (2d) 405 (Ind. S. Ct.. Oct.
21, 1940).
' See American Law Institute. Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure (1930). commentary to section
203. pp 630-4 fdr the citation of the statutes in-
volved. Some states limit the right to court
appointed counsel to capital or felony cases.
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the broad provisions granting the right to
representation by counsel necessarily im-
ply the right to have counsel appointed
whenever the defendant can not other-
wise afford it.
The majority of the constitutions and
early statutes stopped at this point, leaving
it to the courts to determine the right of
the attorneys appointed to receive compen-
sation for their work. There have been a
large number of cases on this problem and
the courts in a majority of the jurisdictions
held that in the absence of statutes speci-
fically allowing compensation the attorney
can look for compensation only to the fu-
ture ability of the defendant to pay.2 Only
Indiana, Iowa and Wisconsin held the at-
torney had a correlative right to compen-
sation growing out of his duty to s'erve when
appointed by the court.3
The courts that have denied compensa-
tion have based their conclusions on sev-
eral lines of reasoning; which are: (1)
Since attorneys are licensed by the courts
and thereby gain special privileges, they in
turn owe certain duties as officers of the
court, one of which is to represent indigent
defendants, when appointed by the court,
without remuneration. 4 (2) The county is
not liable to the appointed attorney be-
cause, the county is not an interested party,
since the prosecution is by and for the state,
or because, by statute, the court cannot
make the county liable except on action of
the county authorities.:, (3) It is the pre-
rogative of the legislature to provide com-
pensation for court officers and, since they
2 7 C. J. S. 1033 §172; 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 377
t1911). See cases cited in notes 4-7 infra.
IDane County v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585 (1861)
,held void a statute providing that county
should not be liable to court appointed coun-
sel); Carpenter v. Dane County. 9 Wis. 249
(1859); Ferguson v. Pottawattamie County, 224
Iowa 516, 278 N. W. 223 (1938) (juvenile court
proceeding); State v. Froah, 220 Iowa 840. 263
N. W. 525 (1935) (held while right to fees they
are limited by the statutory provision): Korf
v. Jasper County. 132 Iowa 682. 108 N. W. 103
(1906); Hyatt v. Hamilton County. 121 Iowa
292. 96 N. W. 855 t1903) (attorney to prosecute
disbarment proceeding); White v. Polk County.
17 Iowa 413 (1864) (special prosecutor); Hall v.
Washington County, 2 G. Greene (Iowa) 473
(1850). For Indiana cases see notes 11-13 infra.
'Nabb v. United States, 1 Ct. Claims (U. S.)
173 (1864); Vise v. County of Hamilton. 19 Ill.
78 (1857); Johnson v. Whiteside County, 110 Ill.
22 (1884); Arkansas County v. Freeman & John-
have made provisions for other court offi-
cers, it is presumed that they did not intend
that the appointed attorneys should be
paid.; (4) Because of his professional
standing the attorney is under a moral duty
to aid needy persons requiring legal aid
whether they can pay him or not.
7
The minority view is just as firmly en-
trenched behind reasons for allowing re-
covery as the majority is behind reasons
for denying it. Most of these have recently
been set out by the Indiana Supreme Court
in Knox County Council v. State ex rel.
McCormick.' In that case two attorneys
were appointed by the Circuit Court to de-
fend a pauper charged with murder. On
change of venue, the cause went to an ad-
joining county where, after the trial, the
court made allowances to the attorneys for
their services in representing the defend-
ant. The Auditor in the envenued county
issued the warrants to the attorneys for
their services 9 but payment was refused by
the Treasurer of that county for want of
funds. The attorneys then brought an ac-
tion to mandate the county council to ap-
propriate sufficient funds to pay the war-
rants. From a judgment holding the county
liable for the fees the county council ap-
pealed to the state Supreme Court where
the judgment was affirmed.
The court in its decision reviews all of
the earlier Indiana decisions which set out
most of the arguments found in the decis-
ions of the three minority states. These
arguments are that the attorney is not
obliged to represent indigents without re-
son. 31 Ark. 266 (1876); Elam v. Johnson. 48
Ga. 348 (1873).
-Pardee v. Salt Lake County. 39 Utah 482,
118 Pac. 122. 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 377 (1911):
Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 62 (1860); Board
of Com'rs of Miami County v. Mowbray. 160
Ind. 10. 66 N. E. 46 (1903): Boykin v. People. 23
Colo. 183, 46 Pac. 635 (1896). See 7 C. J. S.
1033 §172.
"Yates v. Taylor County Court. 47 W. Va.
376. 35 S. E. 24 (1900); Arkansas County v.
Friedman & Johnson. 31 Ark. 266 (1876).
7Elam v. Johnson. 48 Ga. 348 (1873): Rowe v.
Yuba County, 17 Cal. 62 (1860): Lamont v. So-
lano County. 49 Cal. 158 (1874); Henley v. State.
98 Tenn. 665, 41 S. W. 352 (1897); Presby v.
Klickitat County. 5 Wash. 329. 31 Pac. 876 1892)
- 29 N. E. (2d 405 (Ind. S. Ct.. Oct. 21. 1940).
SThe Auditor of Knox County issued the
warrants only after. a judgment against him
mandating the issue of the warrants had been
obtained by the lawyers in the instant case
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muneration for (1) the duty to act as coun-
sel is more than an honorary duty, as some
courts have claimed, for a duty merely
honorary could hardly be susceptible of
enforcement in a court of law,"' and (2)
since the lawyer gets no special benefits
from the public he should not be specially
burdened-the lawyer's "professional serv-
ices are no more at the mercy of the public,
as to remuneration, than are the goods of
the merchant, the crops of the farmer, or
the wares of the mechanics." Yet the bur-
den of defending the poor rests somewhere
so it must rest on the state or a portion of
it. The court has inherent power to do all
things that are reasonably necessary for
the proper administration of justice so,
since it may only try persons given the
right to counsel, must furnish counsel for
those unable to hire their own. and can
only obtain counsel by paying them, it may
10 Webb, Auditor v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16 (1854):
Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525 (1853).
11 Knox County Council v. State ex rel. Mc-
Cormick. 29 N. E. (2d) 405, 408 (Ind. 1940) quot-
ing Webb, Auditor v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16 (1854).
Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525 (1853).
The basis of the instant case, supra, is very
tersely stated at page 413--"The conclusion
seems unavoidable that it is the duty of courts
to see that criminal cases are t-ied; that these
cases cannot be legally tried unless the defend-
ant, if he is a pauper, is provided with counsel;
that attorneys cannot be compelled to serve
without compensation; and therefore that, in
order to conduct a legal trial, the court must
have power to appoint counsel, and order that
such counsel shall be compensated if necessary;
and that the right to provide compensation can-
not be made to depend upon the will of the
Iegislature or of the county council."
2 Gordon v. Board of Com'rs of Dearborn
County, 52 Ind. 322 (1876); Board of Com'rs of
Fountain County v. Wood. 35 Ind. 70 (1871);
Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCor-
mick, 29 N. E. (2d) 405. 408, 413 (Ind. 1940).
Board of Com'rs of Miami County v. Mow-
bray, 160 Ind. 10, 66 N. E. 46 (1903) and Board
of Com'rs of Vigo County v. Moore, 93 Ind.
App. 180, 166 N. E. 779 (1929) held that the court
could not hold the county liable to pay attor-
ney's fees, however, this view was rejected by
both earlier and later cases.
12 "If the prisoner was brought into court not
decently or comfortably clad, and was too poor
to provide for himself, no one would doubt the
power and duty of the court, on general prin-
ciples, without any statute, to order suitable
clothes for him. It cannot be admitted for a
moment that the law regards the physical
wants of the citizen of more consequence than
his life or his liberty. . . . The generous feel-
hold the county liable to pay such counsel.'2
Since the county is a subdivision of the
state it is, as a part of the state, an inter-
ested party and so may be held liable for
such expenses. And further, since the
county provides for the physical needs of
the poor it should certainly provide for
their even more vital legal needs;1 3 and if
it pays a prosecuting attorney and all other
expenses of a trial to convict an accused
person, if guilty, it should also provide a
defense attorney, if needed, to help acquit
him, if innocent.14 '
If the law has remained as first settled
by the courts there would be little value
in discussing the different holdings; it
would be very unlikely that the courts
could have been induced to change posi-
tions of such long standing. However, in
most states the legislatures have alleviated
the severity of the early court holdings by
ings which prompt acts of charity are admir-
able and ennobling to our nature. But even
charity itself almost ceases to be a virtue, when
they, whose duty it is to provide for the poor,
make private charity a pretext for public neg-
lect. If the state has not made provision for
the defense of poor prisoners, it has presumed
and trespassed unjustly upon the rights and
generous feelings of the bar." Knox County
Council v. State ex rel. McCormick. 29 N. E.
(2d) 405, 409 (Ind. 1940) quoting Webb, Auditor
v. Baird. 6 Ind. 13, 18-9 (1854).
14 "Can counsel thus assigned sustain an ac-
tion against the county for their fees? The first
impression is in the negative. Counsel are offi-
cers of the court, and are obliged as such to
render to the court any services that may be
necessary to the maintenance of public justice.
Counsel, with the emoluments, must take the
burdens of their profession. Among the bur-
dens is the gratuitous defense of the poor; and
the remuneration for this, in those cases in
which no remuneration can be had from the
state, must be found, it is urged. in the gen-
eral income of a profession of which such serv-
ice is one of the incidents, as well as in the
consciousness of duty performed. For these and
other reasons it has been held that counsel can
not recover from the county compcnsation for
such services. Yet a more careful examination
teaches us that this view is not consistent
either with English precedent or sound public
policy. Counsel for the defense are as essen-
tial to the due examination of the case as are
counsel for the prosecution; and to leave the
services of the one unremunerated is as im-
politic as it would be to leave the services of
the other unremunerated. If the state pays to
convict its guilty subjects, it should also pay
counsel to acquit such as are innocent." Kerr.
Wharton's Criminal Procedure (10th ed. 1918)
§1494.
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specifically providing for remuneration for
court appointed counsel in certain in-
stances. The statutes are in no way uniform
and in many instances their scope is un-
certain. Because of this, the different con-
siderations for and against payment of
counsel enter into the interpretation of
these statutes and in the pleas to the legis-
latures to alter their statutes or to enact
additional legislation. 6
It is exceedingly difficult to untangle the
opposing considerations involved and sug-
gest an ideal arrangement for paying coun-
sel. Because of his professional position
the lawyer should not refuse to give his
services to those unable to pay for them.'--
Yet it is a heavy burden on the lawyer to
require him to defend an indigent to the
fullest extent of his ability without remun-
13Arizona, Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §44-905;
California, Gen. Laws of Cal. (1937) Art. 1910,
H51. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; Colorado, Colo. Stat. Ann.
(1935) §§502, 503, 504; Connecticut, Gen. Stat. of
Conn. (1930) §6476; Florida, Comp. Gen. Laws
of Fla. (1927) §8375; Hawaii, Rev. Laws of
Hawaii (193 ) §5354; Idaho, Idaho Code Ann.
(1932) §19-1413; Illinois, S. H. Ill. Ann. Stat.
(1935) c. 38 §§730, 730a, c. 34 §§163b. 163c; In-
diana, Burns Ind. Stat. Ann (1933) §§9-1314,
2-211; Iowa, Code of Iowa (1939) §13774; Maine,
Rev. Stat. of Me. (1930) c. 146 §14; Maryland,
Ann. Code of Md. (1939) art. 26 §§7, 8; Massa-
chusetts, Ann. Laws of Mass. (1933) c. 277
§§55, 56; Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938)
§§28.1253, 28.1254, 28.1255; Minnesota, Mason's
Minn. Stat. (1927) §9957; Montana, Rev. Codes
of Mont. (1935) §11886; Nebraska, Comp. Stat.
of Neb. (1929) §29-1803. 29-1804; Nevada, Nev.
Comp. Laws (1929) H510883, 11357, 11358; New
Hampshire, Pub. Laws of N. H. (1926) c. 368
§1, 2, 3; New Jersey, N. J. Stat. Ann. (1939)
§2:190-3; New York, Gilbert's Code of Crim.
Proc. (1940) 5H308, 308a; North Carolina, N. C.
Code of 1939 Ann. 554515, 4516; North Dakota.
Comp. Laws of N. D. (1913) §8965; Ohio. Pages
Ohio Gen. Code (1939) §§13439-2. 13439-3; Okla-
homa, Okla. Stat. (1931) §2929. 2930; Pennsyl-
vania, Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. (1930) title 19
§784; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws of R. I. (1938)
c. 626 §§62, 63; South Dakota, S. D. Code (1939)
§§34.3506, 34.1901; Vermont, Pub. Laws of Vt.
(1933) §2370; Virginia, Va. Code (1936) §4970.
3518; Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. (1939) §357.26: Wash-
ington, Rem. Rev. Stat. (1932) §2305; Wyoming.
Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931) §33-901.
Attorneys appointed by the courts to repre-
sent indigent defendants in Arkansas. Georgia.
Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, West Virginia.
the Federal courts and likely in certain other
states are still allowed no recovery from the
state for their services.
16 ". . . it [the Montana statute] merely pro-
vides that whenever an attorney defends an in-
digent person accused of crime his fee shall
eration, where the preparation of the de-
fense takes a great deal of time and money.
Too often, when no, or grossly inadequate,
fees are allowed, the defense of the indigent
accused is left to unexperienced recent
graduates who are willing to act as counsel
to get experience in handling cases, or to
"'professional" assigned lawyers who haunt
the jails and who are adept at wringing
every possible cent out of the accused's
family and friends." Even when capable
lawyers are assigned they often slight the
assignment because their time is taken up
by work for regular clients or because they
feel a properly prepared defense would be
too expensive. On the other hand, it is
difficult to justify the situation found in
Illinois 0 and apparently also in New York
where certain lawyers make a practice of
be paid by the county, up to the amount speci-
fied. There is, therefore, nothing in the law
to prohibit the district court from appointing
more than one attorney to defend difficult cases
and those of a grave nature, such as the prose-
cution of a man for murder, the matter is left
to the sound judgment of the district judge
presiding, and if the court sees fit to appoint
two, attorneys to defend, each is entitled to
compensation for his services." Huntington v.
Yellowstone County, 80 Mont. 20. 25. 257 Pac.
1041, 1043 (1927).
The question of whether an attorney has a
right to compensation for prosecuting an appeal
or for defending on retrial has called for much
statutory interpretation by the courts; they
have generally interpreted the statutes broadly
to allow added compensation. Moran v. Otoe
County, 95 Neb. 658. 146 N. W. 956 (1914); Tom-
linson v. Monroe County. 134 Iowa 608. 112
N. W. 100 (1907); Washoe County v. Humboldt
County, 14 Nev. 123 (1879): People v. Ferrero.
162 N. Y. 545, 57 N. E. 167 (1900): People v.
Montgomery. 101 App. Div. 338, 91 N. Y. S.
765 (1905): People ex rel. McAvoy v. Pender-
gast, 67 Misc. 541. 124 N. Y. S. 713 (1910). Con-
tra, Czaki v. Coler, 44 App. Div. 183, 60 N. Y. S.
656 (1899); Weisbrod v. Winnebago County, 20
Wis. 418 (1866); John v. Municipal Court of
Milwaukee County. 220 Wis. 334. 264 N. W. 829
(1936). See also Reilly v. Berry. 250 N. Y. 456,
166 N. E. 165 (1929) for the result of an unduly
strict statute.
1, Kraus v. State. 102 Nab. 690. 169 N. W. 3
(1918) (where attorney volunteered to defend
an indigent as a friend of the court he was not
thereafter entitled to compensation for his serv-
ices. either in the trial court or on appeal).
is See R. H. Smith, Justice and the Poor
(1919) 114; W. J. Wood. Unexpected Result from
the Establishment of the Office of Public De-
fender (1916) 7 J. Crim. Law 595.
- The Criminal Colrt in Cook County [Chi-
cago]. Illinois. almost always allows the maxi-
mum statutory fee [$250] in all cases where an
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representing indigents charged with cap-
ital offenses merely for the fees allowed.
While certain types of cases, especially
capital cases, should and usually do take
much more of the attorney's time and ef-
fort than others, it is certainly debatable
whether substantial fees should be allowed
in these cases and none at all in the others,
as some statutes have provided.2- '
The problem is a difficult one; indeed,
it is very unlikely that any arrangement
could work well in all jurisdictions-a
method of compensation in a district where
lawyers generally have some spare time,
where the court procedure is fairly simple,
and where the expenses of practicing law
are comparatively low would likely be
wholly inadequate in a large metropolitan
district. Full time public defenders, ap-
pointed for a specified term and receiving
a fixed salary, have apparently solved the
attorney is assigned. Certain lawyers are thus
able to make a practice of inducing those
charged with capital offenses to object to be-
ing represented by the public defender and so
get themselves appointed to represent these
prisoners. Judging only from the New York
court opinions it appears that the courts in that
state also generally allow the maximum fee
[$1,000].
-2 Florida. Illinois, New Jersey. Massachu-
setts. New York. North Carolina, Pennsylvania.
and Virginia allow compensation only in capi-
tal offenses; Minnesota, Ohio and Vermont also
allow compensation only in certain cases. No
relief is given the attorney who represents in-
digents in other cases in these states.
2 1 The defense of indigents is handled by
public defenders in California. Connecticut. and
certain more populous districts in Illinois. Min-
nesota, Nebraska. and Virginia.
The problem of compensation for court ap-
pointed counsel, discussed in this note is only
one phase of the much larger problem of ob-
taining adequate defense of the poor. The ques-
tion of the advisability of public defenders is
inexorably bound up with this larger problem.
For a full discussion see the following articles
that have previously appeared in the Journal:
N. F. Baker. The Public Defender's Work in
Cook County (1934) 25 J. Crim. Law 5; P. J.
Finnegan The Work of the Public Defender of
Cook County (1936), 26 J. Crim. Law 709. C
Mishkin, The Public Defender (1931). 2 Crim
Law 489, reprinted from 14 Chicago Ba, Assn
Rec. 98; F. R. Anman. Public Defender in the
Municipal Courts of Columbus (1930). 21 J.
Crim. Law 392; R. G. DeForest. Public Defender
in Connecticut (1928). 18 J. Crim. Law 522: S.
Rubin. The Public Defender. An Aid to Crimi-
question of the representation of the in-
digent defendant satisfactorily in the me-
tropolitan districts; but it is very unlikely
that such offices would be practical in the




Yet it would seem very proper to offer
some suggestions. The many state statutds
allowing payment are an indication that
there is a general feeling that counsel
should be paid; and the courts of Indiana,
Iowa, and Wisconsin have furnished suf-
ficient reasons for doing so. Because the
adequate defense of those accused of any
crime take time and money, payment
should seemingly be made in all cases and
should bear some relation to the amount of
work done. 2 2 The attorney should be al-
lowed a reasonable fee for his work and
reimbursement for reasonably necessary
expenses incurred upon appea 2 3 or retrial
nal Justice (1927) 18 J. Crim Law 345; K.
Wynne, Public Defenders in Connecticut (1926),
17 J. Crim. Law 358; Note (1923). 14 J. Crim.
Law 319, reprinted from The Baltimore Sun,
Jan. 29, 1922; W. J. Wood, Necessity for Public
Defender Established by Statistics (1916), 7 J.
Crim. Law 230; M. C. Goldman, The Necessity
for a Public Defender (1915), 5 J. Crim. Law
660; M. C. Goldman, Public Defender (1915), 6
J. Crim. Law 557; R. Ferrari, H. A. Forster,
A. E. Adelman and J. H. Stolper. On the Pub-
lic Defender, a Symposium (1915), 6 J. Crim.
Law 371; A. Adelman, In Defense of the Pub-
lic Defender (1914),* 5 J. Crim. Law 494. See
14 J. Crim. Law 556 for a complete bibliography
on the public defender to 1924. See also R. H.
Smith. Growth of Legal Aid Work in the United
States (1926, rev. ed. 1936); R. H. Smith. Justice
and the Poor (1919); M. C. Goldman, The Pub-
lic Defender, a Necessary Factor in the Ad-
ministration of Justice (1917).
22 New York requires the action to be dis-
posed of by a formal order, ". . . by a verdict
of not guilty, by a conviction or a plea of guilty
and a judgment entered thereon, or else by an
order of the court dismissing the indictmpnt".
so the courts have refused to allow a fee where
there was a mistrial, Stern v. Taylor. 2 N. Y. S.
(2d) 42 (1938): or an agreement not to prose-
cute. Snitkin v. Taylor, 276 N. Y. 148. 11 N. E.
(2d) 573 (1938). regardless of the amount of
work done by the attorney.
2% Additional compensation is allowed by stat-
ute to one who prosecutes an appeal in Illinois,
Iowa, Michigan. Nevada. New York. South Da-
kota, Wisconsin and Hawaii. Other states, by
statutory construction, allow added compensa-
tion on appeal See note 16 supra. Many states
also allow reasonable expenses incurred in the
defense of 'we indigent.
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as well as on the original trial.-" Since the
courts often make a practice of allowing the
maximum fee in practically all cases, this
maximum, if a substantial amount, should
not be set at a flat figure but should be a
stipulated amount for each trial, or better,
for each day of actual trial work. : And
since, at best, a statute can provide pay-
ment that only approximates reasonable
compensation, setting different maximums
for different classes of cases seems justifi-
able. DONALD G. BAIRD.
EVIDENCE OF WOUNDS AS SHOWING INTENT TO MURDER [ALABAMA]
In State v. Beck' the defendant's son,
allegedly at the defendant's bidding, shot
and wounded one Daughtry. For this the
defendant and the son were indicted; it
being alleged that they "unlawfully and
with malice aforethought did assault Ralph
Daughtry with intent to murder him." A
severance was granted and the defendant
was tried and convicted of assault with in-
tent to murder. The question on appeal is
whether testimony allowed by the trial
court that the complainant had "continu-
ously had boils around the wound made
by the shot of Wiley Beck's pistol" was
properly admitted. The court of appeals
held such evidence irrevelant and preju-
dicial to the defendant, and reversed the
trial court. The Supreme Court reversed
the appellate court on the grounds that in
a situation where murderous intent is in-
volved evidence of the nature and result
of the wound may properly be considered
in ascertaining the intent of the assault.
In support of their holding the supreme
court offered the following statement in
Underhill's treatise on Criminal Evidence:
"The evidence of the condition of the per-
son injured, showing the character of his
wounds and the manner in which they were
24 "Nearly every case, if it is to be properly
prepared and tried, involves some cash outlay.
but in the great majority of cases. even where
counsel is assigned, no provision is made for
such expense. This is a substantial defect in
the assigned counsel plan. It means that either
the attorney must pay the incidental expenses
out of his own pocket, which, of course, he
cannot afford to do, and therefore does not do.
or the defendant must go to trial and do the
best he can in spite of an inadequate prepara-
tion of his case. In only eight States are the
expenses defrayed by the State. and in two of
these the expenses will be borne by the State
only in capital cases. In seven States the law
expressly prohibits any reimbursement to the
lawyer for such incidental expenses." R. H.
Smith. Growth of Legal-Aid Work in the
United States (rev. ed. 1936) 78.
2. There are great differences in the size of
the fees allowed by the different state statutes.
treated by the physician, and evidence to
show how long he was confined in a hos-
pital is always relevant on the prosecution
for assault with intent to murder to show
the grevious nature of the injury inflicted,
from which injury the court may infer that
the accused intended to kill the person as-
saulted."
The court then cites Wright v. State- as
authority for its holding. In that case the
question raised was the admissibility of
evidence of the number of wounds inflicted
upon the complainant and its bearing upon
the defendant's intent; testimony was in-
troduced to show that there were fourteen
or fifteen wounds of a serious nature upon
the complainant's body. In that situation
it is clear the number of wounds should be
taken into consideration by the jury. Such
wounds furnish a fairly sound yardstick in
determining the defendant's state of mind
-that he meant to do more than merely
assault. They lend probative force to the
state's hypothesis that the defendant in-
tended to murder the complainant.
This principle, as stated in Underhill and
as applied in the Wright case, has been gen-
erally accepted in determining intent in
criminal cases.I However, it seems clear
Maximums range from $1.000 in New York,
$250 in Illinois, and $200 in Pennsylvania and
Hawaii to $25 in North Dakota, Oklahoma and
Virginia; the statutes in Indiana, Maine. Massa-
chusetts. Michigan, New Jersey, North Caro-
lina and Vermont provide for "reasonable" fees
and set no maximum; the statutes in Idaho.
Iowa and Wyoming allow certain fixed fees to
the court appointed counsel.
1 197 So. 43 (Ala. S. Ct.. Apr. 4. 1940). revers-
ing 197 So. 42 (Ala. App. Ct.. Feb. 27. 1940).
2 Underhill. Criminal Evidence (4th ed. 1935)
§596.
n 184 Ala. 596, 42 So. 745 (1907).
4 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th ed. 1935)
§197; Brown v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 255. 105
S. W. (2d) 820 (1928); State v. Harmon, 127 S.
Car. 424, 121 S. E. 257 (1924); State v. Compton.
48 S. Dak. 430. 205- N. W. 31 (1925); State v.
Young. 52 Ore. 227. 96 Pac. 1067 (1908): Stevens
v. State. 84 Neb. 759. 122 N. W. 58 (1909).
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that in the instant case evidence of the boils
presents an entirely different situation.
Boils around a wound, unlike fourteen
knife thrusts, are demonstrative of no ma-
licious intent on the part of the defendant.
The principle of admitting evidence to
show intent is subject to the basic rule un-
derlying the entire law of evidence-that it
must be relevant to the issue to which it
is addressed. The evidence as to the boils
lacks this essential element; it neither
proves nor supports any theory of the state
as to the defendant's intent at the time of
the shooting.5
The gunshot wound itself furnishes such
evidence and in Alabama establishes a
strong presumption of intent to murder.6
The presence of this presumption may
furnish a reasonable explanation of the
court's decision in the instant case. It may
have considered that the evidence of the
wound established such a strong case that
it could not be overcome by the effect of
•Harcrow v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 274. 261
S. W. 1046 (1924) is the only case similar to the
instant case found; the criticisms of the instant
case are also applicable to it.
"There are two complaints evidenced by bills
of exception showing objections to testimony as
to the fact that Blount took pneumonia, and
pus formed in the wound, and a rib had to be
taken out, and that he wore a tube for some
time; also that the doctor thought Blount was
going to aie, and told him so. We do not re-
gard either of the bills as presenting serious
error. . . . In view of the fact that the jury
gave the appellant the lowest penalty, we do
not regard the evidence as calculated to affect
the minds of the jury or inflame them ...
The deadly character of the weapon and the
serious nature of the injury inflicted were both
the other improperly admitted testimony.
In other words, the error was of insufficient
importance to command a new trial with
its attendant expenses, delays and incon-
veniences.
Such a rationalization, however, is not
justified for, while the presence of intent
might have already been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt by the other evidence,
nevertheless other elements of the crime
were quite likely in issue. Evidence of the
boils was certainly highly inflammatory
and its admission could easily prejudice the
jury and result in a very unfair trial of
the defendant. Evidence, when relevant,
may be prejudicial and still be admissible.7
But when it is both irrelevant and preju-
dicial, as in the case here, it is difficult to
see how a trial judge, in the reasonable
exercise of his judicial discretion could
permit its use, and even more unexplain-
able, how an appellate court could sanction
such discretion.
LERoY A. SOLBERG.
for the jury and were material as reflecting the
intent and purpose of the appellant and the
character of the weapon used by him." id. 1048.
G Underhill, Criminal Evidence (4th ed. 1935)
§596 n. 43; Henson v. State, 112 Ala. 41, 21 So.
79 (1895); DeArman v. State, 71 Ala. 351 (1882);
Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 332 (1875); Clements v.
State, 50 Ala. 117 (1873).
"The general rule, however, is that the law
presumes that a man intends the natural and
necessary consequences of his acts; and so in
case of an assault with a dangerous or deadly
weapon used in such a way as naturally, prob-
ably, or reasonably to produce death or preju-
dice life. intent to kill is presumed." 30 C. J.
140 §347.
7For a discussion of prejudicial testimony
see Note (1941), 31 J. Crim. Law 604.
